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Georgia - between a dream and reality
Marek Matusiak
Following several years of political turmoil triggered by constitutional reform (a shift from 
a presidential to a semi-presidential system) and electoral reshuffles (parliamentary elections 
in 2012; presidential elections in 2013), the political situation in Georgia has stabilised: key 
posts in the country are now in the hands of democratically elected members of the Geor-
gian Dream coalition. Despite its mosaic-like structure and internaltensions, Georgian Dream 
remains strong and enjoys high levels of public support. This puts it in good stead to play 
a central role in Georgian politics in the foreseeable future, including securing victory in the 
local government elections scheduled for June. 
However, local billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili does not currently hold a political office - despite 
the fact that he is the founder, sponsor and undisputed leader of the coalition, as well as former 
prime minister and the most popular public figure in Georgia (besides Patriarch Ilia II). This raises 
several questions, for example: Who is really at the helm of the Georgian state? What is the lon-
g-term vision of the current government? The past achievements of the politically heterogeneo-
us Georgian Dream - dominated by Mr Ivanishvili - offer little help in answering these questions. 
In addition to a series of challenges on the domestic front, the new Georgian leadership is also 
facing strategic geopolitical challenges, compounded by the current conflict in Ukraine. These 
include the future of Georgia’s relations with the West (including the process of EU and NATO 
integration) and with Russia (in response to repeated attempts to re-integrate the post-Soviet 
republics). The scale and dynamism of the changes in both the geopolitical order in the post-
Soviet region and in the relations between Russia and the West are causing further questions 
to be raised about their impact on the position of the Georgian political elite and about their 
consequences for the entire country. 
Who is in charge of Georgia?
Georgian Dream was formed in early 2012 as 
a coalition of six political parties, under Mr Ivan-
ishvili’s leadership, united by their opposition to 
their political predecessors. The coalition1 won 
the parliamentary elections in October 2012 
(55%) and the presidential election in October 
1 During voting, Georgian Dream can count on the sup-
port of an additional 13 independent MPs who won their 
seats as representatives of Mikheil Saakashvili’s United 
National Movement. 
2013 (62%); it has a clear majority in the cur-
rent parliament (86 of 150 seats) and enjoys 
high public approval ratings (61% - based on 
an opinion poll conducted in November 20132). 
It is therefore probable that Georgian Dream 
will continue to govern Georgia for the fore-
seeable future, even though it is likely to come 
under greater public scrutiny than it did during 
a year-long period when it shared power with 
2 See http://www.civil.ge/files/files/2013/NDI-Georgia%20 
November2013-Political.pdf
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the unpopular president Mikheil Saakashvili. 
Georgian Dream is a political project launched 
by Bidzina Ivanishvili - a local billionaire who 
had never previously taken part in Georgia’s 
political life (although he did support Boris 
Yeltsin’s 1996 bid for re-election) and whose 
political views are rather hard to pin down. 
Mr Ivanishvili is Georgia’s wealthiest man3 and 
until his exit from politics in November of last 
year he served as prime minister and the leader 
of the largest party in the coalition. His personal 
popularity (around 74% in November 2013) was 
and remains the main source of public support 
for Georgian Dream, along with the widespread 
public dislike of the previous ruling camp. 
During his year as prime minister, Mr Ivanishvili 
made all major decisions without consultation. 
These include: nominating a presidential can-
didate and his own replacement as prime min-
ister. He not only withheld the most influential 
positions in domestic politics from his coalition 
partners (appointing instead his most trusted 
associates), he also demonstratively removed 
from the cabinet one of the most widely rec-
ognised and most pro-Western politicians in 
the coalition - Irakli Alasania, who lost his post 
as deputy prime minister two months after the 
government was sworn in.
The incumbent president, Giorgi Margvelashvili 
(aged 44, a former university lecturer) and the 
prime minister, Irakli Garibashvili (aged 32; with 
close links to Mr Ivanishvili throughout his po-
litical career) owe their positions entirely to the 
support their have received from Ivanishvili, and 
their experience as politicians and statesmen 
prior to taking office in November 2013 was 
limited to just 9 and 12 months in the Georgian 
Dream government, respectively. In an inter-
view, Garibashvili once said: “Mr Ivanishvili is my 
role model, and I will always follow his example. 
I will always accept advice from him, especial-
ly since I know that this man gives only useful 
3 Forbes magazine has estimated Ivanishvili’s fortune 
at $5.3 billion. Georgia’s budget in 2013 was equal to 
$4.36 billion.  
and beneficial recommendations to his people4”.
Under the circumstances, it is rather surpris-
ing that Mr Ivanishvili recently criticised presi-
dent Giorgi Margvelashvili, stating that despite 
Mr Margvelashvili’s lack of political support and 
experience, he was not sufficiently ‘open’ to his 
suggestions. However, since presidential powers 
in Georgia are rather limited, this state of affairs 
has not diminished Mr Ivanishvili’s influence. 
The key politicians in the ruling camp have close 
personal and/or business links to Mr Ivanishvili 
(the current PM worked as his assistant for 
a number of years). Ivanishvili has publicly ad-
mitted to being “consulted” on government de-
cisions, and has been present at a number of 
official events (most recently, during a visit by 
Romania’s prime minister). His position is also 
strengthened by his role within the Georgian 
Co-Investment Fund5 and in the non-govern-
mental organisation ‘Citizen’ - portrayed in the 
media as the Georgian equivalent of the Soros 
Foundation (according to Mr Ivanishvili, the 
NGO will help people develop skills in “how to 
elect a government and how to keep it account-
able”). Consequently, it has been suggested 
that even as a private person, Mr Ivanishvili has 
managed to retain his role as the de facto leader 
of the country: he remains outside the govern-
ment and bears no political responsibility but 
4 http://rt.com/shows/sophieco/georgia-prime-minis-
ter-eu-572/
5 The private investment fund was launched with Mr Ivan-
ishvili’s help to support the economic development of 
the country. At the time of the launch, Ivanishvili com-
mitted $1 billion of his own money to support the fund. 
See http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26503 and http://
www.gcfund.ge/en/  
Ivanishvili has managed to retain his role 
as the de facto CEO of the country: he 
remains outside the government and 
bears no political responsibility but none-
theless appears to wield the casting vote.
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nonetheless appears to hold the casting vote.
The make-up of the Georgian Dream coalition 
makes it hard to define its political profile. 
During his year as prime minister, Mr Ivanishvili 
gave prominence to different groups across the 
coalition spectrum, depending on the issue at 
hand. Aside from its largest member, Georgian 
Dream – Democratic Georgia (established by 
Mr Ivanishvili himself, and currently chaired by 
Prime Minister Giorgi Margvelashvili), the two 
most prominent parties within the coalition 
are the pro-Western: Our Georgia – Free Dem-
ocrats (led by defence minister Irakli Alasania) 
and the Republican Party (led by the speaker 
of the parliament, Davit Usupashvili). Howev-
er, their decision-making powers on key issues 
seem to remain limited, with the final say be-
ing given to Mr Ivanishvili’s most trusted asso-
ciates, namely, Prime Minister Irakli Garibash-
vili, deputy prime minister Kakha Kaladze, and 
Giorgi Volski - chairman of the Georgian Dream 
– Democratic Georgia parliamentary faction. 
Despite the obvious personal and political ten-
sions, the coalition is likely to survive into the 
foreseeable future. Most of the coalition mem-
bers are quite small and have limited funds. 
A decision to leave the coalition would cost 
them their position on the political scene and 
their posts in the government and could leave 
them open to accusations of links to the previ-
ous ruling camp.
Bringing the previous ruling camp to account 
Under president Saakashvili, Georgia strength-
ened its sovereignty, built up state institutions, 
reduced crime and venality, and successfully 
implemented its policy of closer links with the 
West. At the same time, the period was marked 
by a politicisation of the state apparatus6, the im-
punity of state officials7, restrictions on political 
competition, and questions about the indepen-
dence of the judiciary. Mr Saakashvili’s govern-
ment also took an especially hard line on crime8 
and carried out large-scale personnel changes 
in the civil service. This caused resentment both 
among the Georgian people and among the 
members of the elite marginalised after 2003. 
Consequently, Georgian Dream came to power 
in a country which it believed had been shaped 
into its current form by its political opponents 
(at both the structural and personnel levels). The 
coalition accuses their predecessors of breaking 
the law and violating the rules of democracy, 
and many Georgian Dream members contin-
ue to hold personal grudges against them. 
Therefore, bringing the previous ruling camp 
to account (both legally and politically) and 
taking full control of the state apparatus has 
become a top priority for the new government 
(due to skilled staff shortages within the coa-
lition, Georgian Dream has often been forced 
to appoint people who previously served under 
Eduard Shevardnadze). 
According to unverified figures published in au-
tumn of 2013 by Georgia’s previous ruling party, 
in the course of a single year about 10,000 mem-
bers of the party were interviewed or investigated 
by the police, and 100 people were subsequently 
charged (a long prison sentence was given to, for 
example, the former prime minister and secretary 
general of the United National Movement, Vano 
6 See http://transparency.ge/sites/default/files/post_at-
tachments/Final%20Report%20on%20AAR_ENG_0.pdf 
7 This is exemplified by the still unexplained death of 
Sandro Girgvliani - a young bank employee, who is 
believed to have been murdered by high-ranking Inte-
rior Ministry officials. See a 2011 ruling of the Europe-
an Court of Human Rights: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-104636#{%22item
id%22:[%22001-104636%22]} 
8 In 2011, Georgia had the fourth highest prison popu-
lation in the world per 100,000 residents (after the US, 
Rwanda and Russia). See http://www.prisonstudies.org/
images/news_events/wppl9.pdf 
The government’s top priority is to bring 
the previous ruling camp to account (both 
legally and politically) and to take full con-
trol of the state apparatus.
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Merabishvili). This has attracted criticism from 
the West and suggested parallels with the case 
of Yulia Tymoshenko. In addition, the coalition 
conducted a pressure campaign against mem-
bers of the United National Movement in local 
government, which led to a change in leadership 
in 80% of cases in favour of Georgian Dream, just 
one year before elections9. 
This large-scale campaign to settle accounts 
with the past was the result of a combination 
of factors that are often difficult to define. They 
include, on the one hand, the desire to seek jus-
tice and address the expectations of the Geor-
gian people, who want those guilty of the ex-
cesses of the 2003-2012 period to be punished. 
And on the other, the desire to take revenge, to 
disempower the previously all-powerful ruling 
camp, and to reflect the key tenets of Georgian 
Dream’s political manifesto, which is largely 
based on the promise to “strive for justice”. 
The complexity of this problem has been il-
lustrated by the case of Bacho Akhalaia. Mr 
Akhalaia, who previously served as head of the 
prison service, defence minister and interior 
minister, was arrested on 7 November 2012 and 
sentenced on 28 October 2013 to 3 years and 
9 months in prison for egregious irregularities 
during his time as head of the prison service10. 
It should be noted that back in 2009, Mr Akha-
laia’s nomination as defence minister drew crit-
icism from the US State Department due to al-
legations of human rights abuses in Georgian 
prisons11. Nonetheless, the decision to arrest 
Mr Akhalaia within just two weeks of the 2012 
leadership change on the basis of relatively 
weak evidence (which, in fact, led to his subse-
quent acquittal12) seems to have been linked to 
9 Source: A party information document entitled: “Geor-
gia’s Democratic Backsliding: an Overview”. 
10 Before he left office, president Saakashvili pardoned 
Akhalaia, but the former minister remains in custody on 
other charges. 
11 See http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09TBILISI1765 
_a.html
12 http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26324, http://civil.ge/eng/ 
article.php?id=26642, http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26628 
his strong position within the Georgian Armed 
Forces and to the influence his family retains in 
the Georgian region of Samegrelo. 
The approach taken by the Georgian Dream 
government, including its strong belief that 
extraordinary measures (including, numerous 
violations in investigative and judicial proce-
dures13) are justified by the need to erase all 
traces of the previous regime, resembles the 
approach adopted by the Saakashvili camp to-
wards the political reality it inherited after the 
‘rose revolution’. The current government is 
therefore repeating the mistakes of its prede-
cessors, further weakening the Georgian state. 
One example was the decision to suspend the 
mayor of Tbilisi Gigi Ugulava - the last politi-
cian from the Saakashvili camp in a prominent 
and influential post within the executive. The 
court’s ruling in the case was given on 22 De-
cember of last year under clear pressure from 
the prosecutor’s office (during a late night ses-
sion held behind closed doors) 
This raises concerns about the state of democ-
racy in Georgia, particularly because a series of 
reforms has failed to eliminate the concern that 
the “culture of influence” in local courts and 
the prosecution service make it impossible to 
guarantee a fair trial. Given the government’s 
aggressive rhetoric towards the previous re-
gime, “selective justice” is likely to continue, 
causing tensions in Tbilisi’s relations with the 
West. For example, a recent announcement by 
the prosecution service that it was planning to 
interview Mikheil Saakashvili attracted immedi-
ate criticism from the US State Department.
13 See for example http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26222 
Tbilisi’s relations with the West are like-
ly to suffer if the Georgian Dream govern-
ment continues to repeat the mistakes of its 
predecessors and uses “selective justice”.
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However, it should also be noted that such ir-
regularities have been attracting criticism from 
Georgian NGOs14, which previously were highly 
critical of the Saakashvili camp. The existence 
of apolitical non-governmental organisations in 
Georgia sets it apart from other countries in the 
region and may be instrumental in preventing 
the violation of democratic standards.
The welfare and economic policies 
of Georgian Dream
In addition to settling old political and legal 
scores, the domestic policy pursued by Geor-
gian Dream has focused on two areas: social 
welfare and how to erase the legacy of “author-
itarianism”, “persecution” and the centralisa-
tion of state power.
The neoliberal policies of the Saakashvili govern-
ment were marked by the retreat of the state 
from the social sphere. This was exemplified by 
a lack of public policy on unemployment, no un-
employment benefits, and the privatisation of the 
health service. Meanwhile, high unemployment 
and poverty have for years been the most import-
ant problems facing the people of Georgia.
Since coming to power, the Georgian Dream 
government has raised state pensions by 50%, 
it has offered free basic healthcare insurance 
to all citizens (previously only some groups 
were covered - under 50% of the population15) 
14 Among them are: the Georgian Young Lawyers Association 
(GYLA), Transparency International Georgia, and the Inter-
national Society for Fair Elections and Democracy. 
15 See http://transparency.ge/en/blog/state-sponsored-uni 
versal-healthcare-program-problems-and-recommen-
dations
and has lowered the cost of utilities. It also in-
troduced minor changes to the Labour Code, 
which have nonetheless strengthened the pro-
tection of labour rights (Georgia’s Labour Code 
came under severe criticism from the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation during the previous 
government). All of these measures have been 
instrumental in increasing public support for 
the new government.
Saakashvili’s government pursued a policy of 
“zero tolerance” on crime and corruption. In 
practice, this led to an extremely low acquit-
tal rate in criminal cases16, long prison sentenc-
es and high penalties for tax irregularities. As 
a result, the government managed to reduce 
corruption and crime, and ensured a high tax 
collection rate. However, this approach attract-
ed accusations of Georgia becoming a “police 
state” and of the extortion of money from lo-
cal businesses. Cases of inmate abuse in over-
crowded prisons were also frequently reported.
Meanwhile, the Georgian Dream government 
has introduced changes to the Tax Code to ben-
efit businesses and launched a partial reform 
of the judiciary17. Its most controversial deci-
sion (opposed by the Interior Ministry due to 
its scale and pace) has been a mass amnesty 
which led to the release of nearly 14,000 in-
mates (60%), taking Georgia out of the top ten 
of countries ranked by the prison population, 
and placing it in 60th position (Poland ranks 
66th)18. So far, fears about a spike in crime fol-
lowing the amnesty have proved unfounded. 
However, there have been signs of a resurgence 
of a traditionally strong subculture and hierar-
chy in Georgian prisons - which was previously 
suppressed by the repressive policies pursued 
by the Saakashvili government. This resurgence 
is likely to be linked to a growing criminal struc-
ture in the prison system, and is exemplified by 
16 In 2010, there were only seven acquittals in 17,000 cas-
es. See http://transparency.ge/nis/2011/judiciary#ftn43 
17 Law on Common Courts of 5 April 2013. 
18 http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_
stats.php?area=all&category=wb_poprate
The domestic policy pursued by the new 
government has focused on two areas: 
social welfare and erasing the legacy of 
“authoritarianism”, “persecution” and the 
centralisation of state power. 
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the rising number of strikes and the growing in-
cidence of self-harm among inmates (in a man-
ner imposed by the subculture)19.  
One achievement of the Georgian Dream gov-
ernment has been the passage of a law on 
local government on 5 February of this year. 
The reform envisages direct mayoral elections 
in Georgia’s twelve main cities (currently, only 
in Tbilisi) and grants all of them the status of 
“self-governing cities” (currently enjoyed by 
Georgia’s five largest cities). It also introduces 
direct elections of district heads. The passing 
of the law was just a first step towards the de-
centralisation of the country (for example, the 
government has yet to reform the system of 
local government finance). It should nonethe-
less be seen as an achievement of the current 
leadership since between 2003 and 2012 the 
government made virtually no efforts towards 
this end. 
The public mood in Georgia
The power change and the new government 
policies led to the resurgence of the previously 
dormant or suppressed social malaise. In just 
over a year since Georgian Dream came to pow-
er, the country witnessed a wave of larger and 
smaller strikes and protests against a variety of 
issues, de facto targeted at the previous gov-
ernment.
The most significant change, however, has been 
a rise in conservatism and nationalism, driven 
primarily by the Georgian Orthodox Church. 
Over the year, there have been several demon-
strations against religious and ethnic minorities, 
mainly against the Georgian Muslims who have 
immigrated from Adjara20. Although the scale of 
the protests was limited, their occurrence alone 
was unprecedented since under the previous 
government they simply would not have been 
19 See http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/237968/
20 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013 
-09-04/georgia-conservative-nationalist-sentiment-growing
allowed. Meanwhile, clashes on a much larger 
scale took place on 17 May 2013 when a small 
group of gay rights activists in Tbilisi was con-
fronted by tens of thousands of aggressive op-
ponents led by Orthodox clerics. Twenty-eight 
people were injured in the clashes. 
Georgians are among the most pro-Western 
of all post-Soviet nations. In September of last 
year, 85% percent of Georgians were in favour 
of joining the EU and 81% supported NATO 
membership21. The pro-Western orientation 
primarily reflects Georgia’s sense of history - as 
part of the Christendom - and its aspiration to 
adopt Western standards of living and the rule 
of law. This does not however automatically ex-
tend to the adoption of Western norms on, for 
example, minority groups. The moral and social 
customs present across the EU seem alien to 
a large part of Georgia’s traditionally-minded 
society. This fact may be used as anti-EU pro-
paganda (as was the case in Ukraine22), partic-
ularly by the conservative, nationalist and im-
plicitly pro-Russian political lobby (for example, 
millionaire Levan Vasadze), highlighting the in-
compatibility of “traditional Georgian values” 
with the moral permissiveness in the West. The 
behaviour of some Georgian Dream politicians 
might suggest that the current government 
would prefer this type of opposition force to an 
opposition made up of members of the previ-
ous ruling camp.
The events of 17 May have also shown the pow-
er of the Georgian Orthodox Church (Catholi-
cos-Patriarch Ilia II enjoys the support of over 
21 http://www.civil.ge/files/files/2013/NDI-Sept2013-Poll-
ENG.pdf
22 See e.g. http://vybor.ua/article/grazhdanskoe_obschest-
vo/legalizaciya-gomoseksualizma-na-ukraine.html 
Georgia has seen a rise in conservatism 
and nationalism, driven primarily by the 
Georgian Orthodox Church.
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90% of Georgians23) and the Church’s ambition 
to influence public life (following objections 
from the Georgian Church, the government 
made significant changes to its law on local 
government). Despite international and do-
mestic outcry, the Georgian authorities did not 
prosecute the organisers of the rally24 (nor have 
prosecutions been made after other incidents 
involving members of the Georgian Church).
Foreign policy: between the West and 
Russia, a decisive year?
The Georgian Dream government has main-
tained a pro-Western orientation in its foreign 
policy. Negotiations on an association agree-
ment with the EU have been concluded and the 
document was initially at the Eastern Partnership 
summit in Vilnius in November of last year (the 
agreement is expected to be signed by June this 
year). Tbilisi has also maintained consistent rela-
tions with NATO and the US - for example, Geor-
gia has renewed honoured its commitment to 
maintain a military presence in Afghanistan fol-
lowing the withdrawal of NATO troops in 2014. 
Meanwhile, speculations regarding the extent 
of Mr Ivanishvili’s ties with Russia continue, 
raising questions about his (and Prime Min-
ister Garibashvili’s) commitment to pursuing 
a pro-Western foreign policy. The speculations 
are being fuelled by the continued harassment 
of the government’s political opponents (con-
demned by the EU and the US, and further 
distancing Georgia from the West) and by the 
23 See http://www.civil.ge/files/files/2013/NDI-Georgia%20
September%202013%20Survey%20Political_ENG_vff.pdf
24 Though charges were brought against two clerics: 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26102
attempts to dislodge Mikheil Saakashvili’s par-
ty from its position as Georgia’s main opposi-
tion party and to replace it with a pro-Russian 
party led by Nino Burjanadze. As a result, the 
opposition has accused the government of at-
tempting to sabotage relations with the West 
while maintaining a pro-Western rhetoric. 
The policy on Russia pursued by the Georgian 
Dream government is a significant departure 
from the approach adopted by its predeces-
sors. In 2013 diplomats from both countries 
held a series of official meetings. Tbilisi has 
abandoned its anti-Russian rhetoric and made 
numerous goodwill gestures towards Moscow 
(including the decision not to boycott the Sochi 
Winter Olympics). Moscow, meanwhile has wel-
comed Tbilisi’s attempts to bring the previous 
ruling camp to account and the government 
has refrained from criticising Moscow even 
when Russian border guards began putting up 
barbed wire fencing along the de facto border 
between Georgia proper and South Ossetia. 
In exchange, Georgia has been given access to 
Russia’s food market. In the first year after Mos-
cow lifted its embargo, the value of Georgian 
food exports to Russia reached $190 million (or 
15% of Georgia’s total exports in 2013), and 
Georgia’s wine export doubled25.
However, Russia’s determination to rebuild 
a sphere of influence over the CIS - as exem-
plified by the developments in Ukraine and by 
Moscow’s relations with the West - means that 
Tbilisi may not be able to reconcile a pro-West-
ern foreign policy orientation and its attempts 
to ease tensions in its relations with Russia. In 
fact, Georgia could find itself facing pressure 
from Moscow to abandon its plans to sign an 
association agreement with the EU. 
Georgia’s main political leaders (the prime 
minister, the president, and Bidzina Ivanishvili) 
have said that the decision to sign the associa-
tion agreement has been made and would not 
be changed, adding that Russia has exhausted 
25 http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26885
Georgia is now more open to ties with 
Russia and more susceptible to Russian 
pressure. 
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its capacity to put pressure on Georgia26. In re-
ality, however, the annexation of Crimea and 
Moscow’s aggressive policy on Ukraine are be-
ing followed with great concern in Tbilisi. The 
potential triumph of Russian interests  in Kyiv 
would be seen by Georgia as a clear indication 
that Moscow can still exert influence over the 
countries of the Eastern Partnership. 
Conclusions and the outlook for the future
Georgia has been relatively successful in nego-
tiating a difficult transition period over the past 
few years. This included a major shift on the 
political scene (the formation of a new political 
force in the form of the Georgian Dream coali-
tion, and its victory in democratic elections) as 
well as changes to the political system (constitu-
tional reform). The new government has a strong 
electoral mandate, it enjoys high levels of pub-
lic support, and it has retained its key policies 
while attempting moderate reform. All this is un-
doubtedly a good sign for Georgia and the new 
ruling elite. At the same time, on the domestic 
front, concerns have been voiced about the pre-
occupation with political retaliation against the 
former ruling camp and about the emergence of 
an informal political system centred on Bidzina 
Ivanishvili - who does not officially  hold any 
public office. Allowing this trend to continue 
could have negative consequences for Georgia 
and the state of democracy in the country.
At present, Georgia’s main challenge is its re-
26 See http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26758
lations with Russia and the West (which is only 
partially linked to the policies pursued by the 
new government). Over the past two decades 
(and especially under Saakashvili), all positive 
changes in Georgia, such as democratisation, 
reforms or sovereignty, have stemmed from its 
pro-Western orientation, which has also been 
taken on by the Georgian Dream coalition (as 
exemplified, for example, by its determined 
efforts towards EU and NATO membership). 
Nonetheless, there are a series of factors that 
could threaten Tbilisi’s pro-Western foreign 
policy. First, the tangible effects of Georgia’s in-
tegration with the EU have been rather limited 
(in fact, the West has little interest in Georgia); 
second, Georgian Dream has adopted a more 
open policy on Russia (leading to an increase 
in trade, greater exposure to Russia’s ‘soft 
power’, and the return of pro-Russian rheto-
ric in the public sphere27, which also taps into 
the moral conservatism of the Georgian peo-
ple); and above all, Russia’s recent aggression 
against Ukraine, which has produced a limited 
response form the West. Without strong and 
tangible support from the West – which has till 
now been the guarantor of security, democ-
ratisation and modernisation in Georgia – the 
country could become powerless against the 
inevitable Russian pressure (which could also 
be ruthless - as exemplified by the crisis in 
Ukraine), leading to the destabilisation of the 
country and the undoing of the progress made 
over the past two decades. 
27 See http://www.vestikavkaza.ru/news/Biznesmeny-Gru-
zii-protiv-Assotsiatsii-s-ES.html
